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Abstract
Intensive care frequently results in unintentional harm to patients and statistics don’t seem to improve. The ICU
environment is especially unforgiving for mistakes due to the multidisciplinary, time-critical nature of care and
vulnerability of the patients. Human factors account for the majority of adverse events and a sound safety climate
is therefore essential. This article reviews the existing literature on aviation-derived training called Crew Resource
Management (CRM) and discusses its application in critical care medicine. CRM focuses on teamwork, threat and
error management and blame free discussion of human mistakes. Though evidence is still scarce, the authors
consider CRM to be a promising tool for culture change in the ICU setting, if supported by leadership and
well-designed follow-up.
Keywords: Intensive care, Human factors, Safety climate, Crew resource management
Introduction
Despite modern equipment, continuing research and ex-
cellent training facilities our western health care system
has a serious safety problem. It is estimated that out of
all hospital admissions 2.9% to 16.6% suffer uninten-
tional harm and in the USA alone up to 100,000 people
may die as a result of medical errors [1]. Data from the
Netherlands (2004) seem to support this with an annual
number of 30.000 patients suffering preventable harm
including approximately 1.735 avoidable deaths [2]. The
financial cost of avoidable adverse events was estimated
to be 1% of the hospital total budget [3].
These alarming reports resulted internationally in
increased pressure to improve patient safety. In line with
the current safety paradigm that limiting human variabil-
ity in otherwise safe systems will lead to safer care [4],
this resulted in more stringent procedural guidelines.
Checklists, time-outs and safety management systems
were subsequently implemented [5]. Unfortunately,
current efforts have not eliminated human error [2] and
as expected matters are worse in the ICU environment
[6-8]. Patients in the ICU frequently suffer from severe,
multiple-system disorders that require more testing,
monitoring, invasive treatment and intravenous medica-
tions than in any other hospital department [9]. Errors in
this setting have a greater impact due to the increased
vulnerability of the patient. The sheer number of avail-
able data essential to make a single decision is daunting.
Furthermore, ‘rogue’ data (irrelevant but abnormal e.g. a
high glucose value) unrelated to the true problem can
cause a change or loss in focus on the ‘real’ problem. This
puts great pressure on multidisciplinary planning and de-
cision making and combined with the time-critical
aspects of the ICU environment increases patient risk.
Identifying the key factors in safe critical care is a chal-
lenging task. Human factors appear to play an important
role [10]. Less often organizational and technical factors
are involved. This is consistent with publications from
other critical industries [11].
Safety climate
If safe critical care relies on the interdisciplinary perform-
ance of a care team as much as on individual expertise, it
makes sense to establish a sound safety culture as the basis
of improving patient outcomes [12]. From an anthropo-
logical standpoint, “safety culture” is only measurable by
careful, long-term observations. Therefore, in the evidence
–driven medical world it may be more appropriate to use
the term “safety climate”, which can be assessed by ques-
tionnaires. The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) is
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widely regarded to be valid, reliable, psychometrically
sound and responsive to interventions [13]. Evidence from
other critical industries suggests that “safety climate” cor-
relates with unsafe and safety-specific behavior, injury
rates and accidents [14,15]. Likewise, in the medical litera-
ture the “safety climate” of a hospital unit is considered
one of the main contributing factors to a better quality of
care [16]. How could we improve this safety climate?
The majority of current interventions focus on imple-
menting safety tools such as event-reporting systems,
quality and safety dashboards, evidence-based guidelines
and checklists [4]. Even though the results of a compre-
hensive unit-based safety program (CUSP) are promising
[13,16], introducing more stringent rules potentially
increases the gap between procedure and practice [17].
Therefore, the question remains if these tools can be
truly effective in the traditional hospital climate, where
highly trained professionals tend to focus more on in-
dividual performance than team effectiveness [18].
Moreover, the typical culture in which junior members
of the ICU staff should not question the decisions
made by senior members adds to the challenge [19].
Parallels
We can definitely learn from methods developed in
other critical industries, despite the perceived procedural
differences with health care [20,21]. One example is the
professional civilian or military aviation industry. Up to
1977 aviation industry could be classified as a profes-
sional-centered, hierarchic working environment. This
all changed with the Tenerife disaster. A KLM Boeing
747 at take-off crashed into Pan Am flight 736 still taxi-
ing at the Los Rodeos airport runway. The accident in-
vestigation report (backed by objective cockpit voice and
flight data recorder information) later revealed that
human factors contributed to the deadliest mishap in
aviation history that claimed 583 lives. Ineffective radio
communication with Air Traffic Control due to non-
standard terminology and language barrier issues led to
misinterpretation of the actual situation and a premature
take-off decision of the KLM captain. The steep
authority-gradient in the Dutch cockpit prevented the
crew from challenging the captain’s decision. As part of
the solution to prevent this from happening ever again,
a compulsory Human Factor training for all aircrew
personnel was advised after follow-up research. This an-
nual training, called Crew Resource Management (CRM),
was developed in 1979 in a workshop sponsored by NASA
[22]. CRM has meant a huge leap forward in improving
aircrew team performance in civilian as well as in military
aviation. The focus of CRM is on threat and error manage-
ment and early identification with blame free countering of
human mistakes. By now CRM training is mandatory for
professional aircrew in Europe and the USA.
How does this fit in the intensive care environment? In
the ICU there is inherently much emphasis on technical
skills and not on communication, teamwork and leader-
ship. These latter skills are still rarely deliberately taught
or sought after from applicants [21], resulting in critical
care practitioners being relatively unprepared to meet
the demands of the increasingly complex ICU environ-
ment [1,23]. This is the basis for suboptimal coordination
of multidisciplinary care and the resultant high number
of ICU errors [24]. The traditional critical care environ-
ment has a tendency to focus on the performance of a
particular practitioner rather than on the system of
care.
In aviation, Non-technical skills, a blame-free environ-
ment and Team Situational Awareness (SA) are consid-
ered CRM core competencies that require specific and
focused training [25]. Team SA is defined as the ability
to identify, process, and comprehend the critical ele-
ments of information about what is happening to the
team with regards to the mission. Team SA is consid-
ered to be the basis for effective decision making in crit-
ical environments and a core competence for any
professional team. The archetypical medical specialist’s
personality (highly motivated, A-type, control freak)
helps in creating an environment in which a junior
team member could feel inhibited to offer input in a
senior team with “vertical” leadership. This impacts
Team SA, posing a threat to process safety, and thus
patient safety [23].
Where is the evidence?
ICUs with a “team-oriented culture” have shorter lengths
of stay, lower nursing turnover, higher quality of care
and can better meet family members’ needs [26]. As dis-
cussed above, general information on a department’s
safety climate may be obtained by questionnaires and
reviews of complication data [16]. Objective team per-
formance data in regards to specific adverse events is
hard to obtain. Although the patient monitor and venti-
lator store data, the process by which decisions are made
is only available afterwards in the form of doctor’s and
nurse’s notes. Video monitoring with voice recording is
not widely available for debriefing purposes. This limits
the visibility of the role of Human Factors in peer
reviews and morbidity and mortality conferences. The
effect of national rules and regulations cannot be overes-
timated. In the USA, according to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the simple
concept of video recording a trauma resuscitation
requires review by a lawyer and, according to the Joint
Commission in the US, patient permission and is, thus,
not a widely accepted practice.
To date no evidence is available from the ICU envir-
onment that CRM training improves patient safety.
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Notably, most team training evaluations have been con-
ducted in the military and aviation environment [27].
These results look promising, and recent evidence also
shows a positive effect of team training in the Operating
Room [28,29]. Neily et al. analyzed surgical mortality
data from 108 Veterans Affairs Hospitals and showed
that a Medical Team Training program resulted in sig-
nificant reduction in surgical mortality rates [29]. Unfor-
tunately, results from other authors are less favourable.
Even though non-technical skills, attitudes and team-
work climate seem to improve, no significant effect on
operating time, length of hospital stay (LOS) was found
[30]. Considerable cultural resistance to adoption is
encountered, particularly among medical staff. Debrief-
ing and challenging authority seemed more difficult to
adopt than other parts of the training [30].
Changing the climate: implementation
Crew Resource Management training for Royal Nether-
lands Air Force (RNLAF) aircrew is a 2-day full time
interdisciplinary training. The training syllabus consists
of lectures in cognitive psychology and multiple inter-
active sessions using realistic data.
Key subjects in the CRM-syllabus are:
– Situational Awareness and recognition of adverse
situations
– Human errors and non-punitive response
– Communication and crosscheck techniques
– Give and receive performance feedback
– Management of stress, workload and fatigue
– Creating and maintaining team structure and
climate
– Leadership
– Risk management and decision-making
Any CRM-training has to meet Federal Aviation Au-
thority (FAA) or Joint Aviation Authority (JAR) regula-
tions. Not only do they define the various subjects but
also the extent to which each subject should be dis-
cussed and set limits for refresher training. This
standardization is a major contributing factor to the suc-
cess of CRM.
Medical CRM-training has no international standard
yet. Medical Human Factors awareness training initiatives
may vary in curriculum, duration, intensity and follow-on
support. The U.S. Department of Defense’s Patient Safety
Program developed TeamSTEPPS, an evidence-based
teamwork system, in collaboration with the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). TeamSTEPPS
has been implemented in a variety of clinical settings and
shown team performance improvement in pediatric and
surgical ICUs [31]. Still, any hospital department deciding
that CRM is the way forward to improve patient safety
should realize it’s not just a single shot training investment
(which can be very effective in itself [29]) but part of a cul-
ture intervention. There will be understandable reluctance
in the medical community to accept the necessity of a
CRM-culture intervention in their professional environ-
ment. Even though further studies are needed to define
the optimal training package [29], some basic guidelines
may be given.
1. CRM training. The goal of this training is creating
awareness of the human factors that influence team per-
formance. We suggest a 2-day full time training contain-
ing the key subjects of aviation CRM as discussed above.
As the multidisciplinary ICU environment requires a dif-
ferent non-technical skillset than a cockpit, medical
CRM training should be tailored to the specific depart-
ment’s environment. This is where some current training
initiatives fall short. Tailoring CRM-training to the spe-
cific needs of an ICU requires insight in the specific
clinical processes and culture [32]. ICU professionals
have no tradition in briefing and debriefing techniques
and performance feedback. ICU-CRM training should
therefore emphasize:
– briefing and debriefing skills using exercises and
actual ICU video footage
– the effective use of checklists
– identifying team roles
– promoting structure, reduction of ineffective
communication
– performance feedback as an essential requirement in
CRM. This starts with careful consideration of
timing and relevance of the message, followed by
3 levels of performance feedback. The first level
requires the team member to formulate the message
short, clear and non-blaming (“doctor, I’m not sure
we did all the checks. . .”). The second level contains
a key word that has a defined value (“doctor, I’m not
comfortable with that decision. . .”). If this feedback
is ignored, and the situation is considered
unacceptable the last resort could be a request to
“stop the procedure”.
One CRM-tool used at the Mayo Clinic to help facili-
tate accurate communication in stressful medical situa-
tions is based upon the work by Patterson et al [33].
Medical personnel are taught how to communicate with-
out creating conflict or in the face of apparent conflict.
This model has proven useful while multiple other
endeavors have been created and implemented to foster
the ultimate safe environment.
We are currently developing evidence-based require-
ments for a national ICU-CRM training curriculum in
the Netherlands. The basis is a 2-day CRM-training
using lectures, video-feedback and interactive exercises.
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This training is followed by a 1-year implementation
phase in which a core group of department professionals
is coached by aviation professionals. Results will be pub-
lished in the near future.
2. CRM implementation. To be successful, the culture
change should be supported by additional measures. A
core group of ICU-professionals should receive extra
coaching during the year after the training to be able to
integrate and develop the new way of professional inter-
action within the ICU-department. And even though
CRM relies on intrinsic motivation to be effective, the
department leadership needs to clarify to all staff before-
hand that CRM is not a noncommittal system but will
serve as a yardstick for professional evaluation too. This
requires leadership by example.
3. CRM and simulation. The effect of CRM-based cul-
ture change is reinforced by the use of scenario-based
team training exercises, again derived from aviation
simulation expertise [34]. Simulation creates a zero-risk
environment that allows medical teams to practice high-
risk, low frequency events without endangering patients
[25]. This training can either be done in an artificial “la-
boratory” environment or “in situ”-training, which is
conducted on actual patient care units involving actual
health care team members and actual organization pro-
cesses [33]. Simulation – if well debriefed - has many
advantages, but if used as a stand-alone modus without
the basis of CRM-training holds the risk of focusing too
much on technical skills and single-task performance
[35]. This will result in a limited impact on patient
safety. Key to the success of team training tools in health
care is the identification of the domain-specific team
skills required for effectively managing routine and
emergency scenarios [36]. We suggest to implement two
separate phases of simulation training: the first level of
training mainly focusing on technical skills, then CRM-
training (classroom) followed by second level simulation
training that focuses on non-technical performance.
4. CRM retention. Research in military aviation shows
that retention of the CRM-subject matter and the effect
on aircrew attitude degrades after 3 years. Therefore
CRM-refresher training in the RNLAF is scheduled
every 3 years [37]. Whether the hospital setting calls for
a similar refresher-schedule or regular well-debriefed
simulation sessions are effective enough is still unclear.
Conclusion
Human Factors account for the majority of adverse
events in aviation as well as in clinical medicine. The
current safety paradigm is still based on ways to limit
human variability in otherwise safe systems, promoting
stringent procedural guidelines. CRM focuses on im-
proving interprofessional cooperation and team per-
formance and thus patient safety. Even though evidence
of CRM on medical errors and patient outcome is still
scarce, the parallels between the critical processes in
aviation and Intensive Care suggest that a well-adapted
medical CRM training has potential for the ICU envir-
onment too.
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